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Jargon, Misunderstandings and the Political Capture of the Ordinary Citizen

There is a figure almost always missing from contemporary debates about sex, gender and identity. Not because this person lacks political importance, but precisely because their relationship to these issues seems too ordinary to deserve intellectual attention. It is the citizen who has never read Judith Butler, does not know what performativity means and probably could not explain with precision the difference between biological sex, gender identity, gender expression and gender role. They work, pay taxes, watch television, listen to the radio in the car, talk to colleagues, relatives and neighbours, and vote every few years. They have a gay colleague, a lesbian niece or a trans acquaintance. They do not fully understand those experiences and use a vocabulary that would make more than one university seminar shudder. Yet they have no particular interest in persecuting anyone either. Their political position fits inside an intellectually modest but historically far from negligible formula: let people live as they wish and do not screw them over for it.

This figure tends to appear in analysis mainly when they stop behaving as expected. As long as they silently accept the expansion of rights, their indifference attracts little interest. When they express rejection of certain formulations or policies connected with gender, however, they quickly become an object of explanation: persistent prejudice, conservative reaction, transphobia, algorithmic radicalisation, the rise of the far right. Some of those explanations are correct in many cases. But they can replace a different question: what did this person hear before reacting, how was the discourse they received organised, and how much of their reaction answered a reasonable objection before being absorbed into a more radical political language?

The scope of the thesis is narrower. This text does not attempt by itself to explain the growth of the reactionary right, nor to settle disputes over the ontology of sex. It argues that there is a discursive mechanism by which disagreements that are not reactionary in origin become integrated into reactionary political packages when the language capable of articulating those disagreements finds recognition only in that camp. The existence of the mechanism can be established conceptually; its population frequency and electoral weight are separate empirical questions requiring another kind of evidence.

Having made that distinction once, there is no need to ask permission again in every paragraph.

From Specialist Language to Political Package

Different propositions begin circulating as though they stood in a necessary relation to one another.

“A newborn’s sex can be objectively observed at birth” travels alongside “trans people do not exist”. “Sex matters for certain institutional classifications” ends up joined to “trans people threaten society”. “Recording neonatal sex is not violence” appears inside the same package as “all legal recognition of gender identity should be abolished”. There is no valid inference from the first proposition in each pair to the second. Additional premises are required.

The reverse happens too. “Trans people deserve legal recognition and protection from discrimination” circulates attached to claims about the nature of sex, the general priority of subjective identity or the oppressive character of certain bodily classifications. There is no logical necessity there either. Defending trans rights does not require adopting a particular ontology of sex, nor accepting that every sexual category is a political imposition.

This packaging turns independent propositions into markers of belonging to complete political blocs. Whoever accepts one seems obliged to accept them all; whoever objects to another is displaced towards the opposing camp. Disagreement stops being organised by content and starts being organised by alignment.6,7,16

This helps explain why certain expressions take on far greater importance once they leave specialist settings. “Sex assigned at birth”, for example, has a perfectly intelligible technical use in clinical, epidemiological and administrative contexts: it allows the datum recorded at birth to be distinguished from later variables such as declared gender identity. Used that way, its function is simply not to collapse different variables into one.3,13,15

I do not share the expression “sex assigned at birth”, because sex is not “assigned”; it is observed and recorded. The overwhelming majority of those observations correspond with the gendered reality that later appears. The fact that some people diverge from this category at some point in their lives does not invalidate the original category or its descriptions.

But that is not the only way the expression circulates publicly. Its most visible public version links assignment to normative imposition and, in its strongest form, to violence exercised by the medical system. That version travels better than administrative precision because it generates conflict, reaction and headlines. The citizen therefore does not receive a technical distinction between variables. They receive a moral thesis: that when a doctor observes a newborn’s sex characteristics and records the child as male or female, the doctor is committing a form of violence.1,2

The citizen’s confusion requires no deep psychological explanation. The proposition is strong. If identifying a newborn’s sex constitutes violence, one must explain what makes the act violent, what the institutional alternative would be, what distinction exists between describing a bodily characteristic and prescribing a future identity, and how institutions that need to record sex variables for medical, statistical or administrative reasons should operate. Those are substantive questions, not symptoms.

Specialist vocabulary does not communicate content alone. It also signals epistemic authority. When someone hears “significant at 0.05”, even if they cannot evaluate the statistical analysis, they understand that a technical procedure lies behind it. Likewise, terms such as performativity, cisheteronormativity or the claim that self-identification is immune to external semantic questioning can convey the impression that the conceptual terrain has already been settled and that the central disagreement belongs to the past.1,17

In this field that signal often exceeds the actual consensus. Debates about bodily materiality, identity, performativity, social classification and trans experience run through the emancipatory field itself. Prosser disputes certain uses of performativity from a trans position; Namaste criticises a queer theory that celebrates transness discursively while neglecting material conditions of life; different feminist and queer currents disagree over the status of sex categories and what should be done with them politically. The field contains accumulated knowledge, but it also preserves disagreement over central questions.4,5

Presenting one of those positions as simply “what we know” creates a false impression of consensus. When the listener notices the distance between the confidence of the vocabulary and the dispute behind it, the logical reaction is not necessarily “I do not understand”. It may also be: “you are presenting as settled something that is not settled”.

The citizen does not need to have read gender theory to notice that a strong claim requires a strong justification.

From Objection to Diagnosis of the Objector

Disagreement stops being treated as a proposition and begins to be interpreted as information about the person who formulates it.

A sentence such as “a newborn’s sex can be identified” intends to say something about the world. It is debated through definitions, evidence, counterexamples and reasons. By contrast, a statement such as “you are transphobic” attributes a disposition or characteristic to the interlocutor. A persistent sequence of discriminatory acts, explicit statements or hostile practices may justify that attribution. The problem arises when the inference is made directly from a contested proposition to a moral diagnosis of the subject.

Act and character collapse into one another.

Instead of “this claim has this problem”, “this practice produces this effect” or “this criterion excludes in this way”, the sentence becomes “you are this”. Disagreement is transformed into evidence about the kind of person speaking. Predicates of action keep the dispute localised: a claim can be defended, corrected or abandoned. Predicates of character expand the conflict towards the interlocutor’s entire moral identity.

This shift becomes especially problematic when it leaves private conversation and enters institutions with sanctioning power. Two people arguing in a bar can accuse one another of monumental stupidity, a venerable human tradition. Something else happens when an attribution of hostility is used to justify a workplace, professional, educational, administrative or platform sanction. There the category needs clear criteria, proportionality, possibility of review and guarantees proportionate to its material consequences.

A person who says “a man is born a man” may believe they are merely making an anatomical proposition, but if they are speaking to someone whose identity contradicts that classification, the sentence also acts on the relationship. It classifies the interlocutor against their own declaration. Recognising that effect does not settle the truth of the proposition, nor authorise an automatic inference of hostile intent. It requires us to distinguish two planes that are often mixed together: what a statement says about the world and what that statement does in a concrete interaction.

The same interpretive charity routinely granted to academic language ought to be extended to ordinary language. When a philosopher formulates an obscure sentence, generations of commentators reconstruct levels, contexts and possible meanings before concluding that the philosopher said something stupid. When an ordinary person awkwardly says “a man is born a man”, a complete political metaphysics is too easily attributed to them.

The demand is more modest: do not infer more from ordinary language than it contains.

A person who maintains that biological sex exists and is usually identifiable at birth has not yet said what they think about documents, hormone treatment, marriage, employment, discrimination, gender expression, sport or prisons. The distance between those questions is enormous, and preserving that distance is precisely the point.

We are placing in the same category the person who wants to persecute trans people and the person who is perfectly content for an adult to live as they wish but considers the claim that recording neonatal sex constitutes violence absurd. Those are normatively very different positions.

Ordinary questions also point to real institutional conflicts. What does a doctor record at birth, and which variables does a medical history need? How are health statistics constructed? When does sex matter and when is it irrelevant? Should a legal category always coincide with a biological classification? What happens when different institutions use similar categories for different purposes? Does one rule work equally well for documentation, medicine, competitive sport, statistics and the prison system?

Asking those questions does not amount to denying anyone’s dignity. It is what inevitably happens when a theory leaves the seminar room and enters forms, protocols, indicators, regulations and laws. Politics retains a distinctly unglamorous but persistent characteristic: eventually, things have to be administered.

From Confusion to Capture

The political risk appears when a reasonable disagreement has no available language inside the camp defending rights and finds recognition only in the camp that seeks to restrict them.

The sequence can look like this:

A) “I do not care what you do with your life and I want you to have the same rights.”

B) “Recording a baby’s sex is violence.”

C) “Self-determination should prevail in every institutional classification.”

D) “Questioning C is denying that trans people exist.”

E) “See? They have all gone mad. I am going to give you common sense back.”

A is an ordinary liberal position. It contains no sophisticated theory of recognition, but neither does it contain a persecutory impulse: it expresses a basic disposition towards coexistence. E is effective because it verbalises an objection A already possessed before encountering E. It does not need to manufacture confusion from scratch. It recognises it, validates it and offers a political explanation.

That is where capture begins.

The citizen does not move directly from “live and let live” to a complete reactionary doctrine because they suddenly discovered they hated trans people. They enter through a narrower door: the only camp willing to say their objection is not absurd happens to be the one with a much larger package already prepared.6,18,19

That package incorporates conclusions that do not follow from the initial objection: trans identities are fraudulent, legal recognition is a privilege, and every anti-discrimination policy is authoritarian. It may also gather homosexuality, transsexuality and certain changes in family life into a single narrative of decline, until the restoration of social hierarchies is presented as a condition for recovering biological reality. The limited intuition then becomes an entry point into an ideological identity citizen A had never imagined adopting.

That is why the explanation “society became reactionary” is insufficient. It describes the result without reconstructing the route, and cannot distinguish between someone who already held a reactionary ontology and someone who gradually incorporated that framework because it was the only one that recognised a prior disagreement as legitimate.

And unpleasant as this may be, both camps can end up giving each other material with which to justify radical positions. The reactionary selects the most extravagant progressive claim and says: “This proves we were always right about them.” On the other side, the resulting reaction can be read as proof that every objection always concealed hatred. Each extreme thus finds in the adversary’s worst representative a reason to present its own moderation as irresponsible.

This reciprocal discursive functionality does not imply moral equivalence or identical aims: each radicalism can turn the other into evidence of necessity.

Moderation also has structural difficulty becoming visible. “Trans people should have the same rights and biological sex remains relevant to certain institutions” performs poorly inside a media architecture organised around conflict. It does not outrage anyone enough, offers no clear enemy and does not let the audience identify within five seconds which tribe the speaker belongs to. Its main media defect is precisely its main political virtue: it distinguishes.8,20,21

The thesis defended here is conceptual: discursive packages can connect a limited objection to a broader political programme. Determining how often that route occurs and how much it matters electorally requires another kind of evidence: opinion studies, longitudinal analysis, electoral data and comparison with rival explanations.

What to Do with the Ordinary Citizen

The first temptation is to demand that “emancipatory movements communicate better”. The sentence sounds sensible and means very little until we identify who should do what.

Part of the phenomenon belongs to the architecture of circulation. Platforms reward interaction, outrage produces interaction and maximalist formulations survive better than cautious distinctions. Recommendation systems, economic incentives and competition for attention can select those outcomes without any central will tasked with amplifying every extreme. Platforms, of course, are not natural phenomena either: they have designers, owners, metrics and product decisions. The aggregate result can emerge from that set of incentives without being reducible to the individual intention of any participant.8,9,20,21

Other decisions are perfectly identifiable. Someone decides the headline, which clip to cut, whom to invite onto a panel, which style guide to write, which concepts to incorporate into a campaign and which language to turn into institutional protocol. There the demand is concrete: do not present as consensus what remains disputed, do not turn specialist jargon into self-evident truth, distinguish a term’s technical use from its normative extensions, and do not treat misunderstanding as a moral confession.

The ordinary liberal position offers a starting point precisely because it does not require metaphysical consensus. “I do not need to fully understand who you are in order to recognise that your life belongs to you” is a theoretically thin but politically powerful formula. It allows people with incompatible conceptions of sex, gender, religion, human nature and morality to share a legal order without forcing one another through an intellectual conversion first.10,11,12

A liberal defence of trans people does not need to assert that sex has no objective reality, that every sexual classification constitutes violence or that subjective identity automatically resolves every institutional conflict. Recognising the materiality of sex is compatible with maintaining that this materiality gives neither the state nor third parties unlimited authority over a person’s life, and with defending recognition, autonomy and legal protection without making one particular theory of gender a condition of citizenship.

That framework handles negative liberty well and becomes insufficient where shared institutions begin. The neighbour who does not want to interfere in somebody else’s life has a simple rule: live and let live. Competitive sport, prisons, certain sex-segregated spaces, medicine and statistical registers cannot abstain from deciding. There, classification has costs and refusing to classify has costs too. The question is no longer merely how much room we leave for individual freedom, but which criterion serves each institutional function.

Ordinary liberalism works here as a framework for discussion, not as an automatic solution. It makes it possible to debate these conflicts without turning every technical disagreement into an existential repudiation.

That requires recovering ordinary language before the reaction manages to monopolise it. If only one political extreme is willing to say that sex exists, that bodily differences matter in medicine or that some institutions need operational categories, that extreme receives for free the appearance of representing reality against ideology. From there it incorporates conclusions that follow from none of those premises.

The task is to contest the consequences of common sense without handing common sense over to reaction.

The existence of sex does not imply that trans people lack rights. The medical usefulness of a classification does not require that classification to determine every aspect of legal life. A policy based on gender identity can be criticised without that entailing the elimination of all recognition. And rejecting the idea that recording neonatal sex constitutes violence still tells us nothing about what someone thinks of a trans person’s dignity, autonomy or legal equality. Breaking those false bridges is part of the task.

The citizen who never read gender theory is not an intellectually backward residue who must be educated until they acquire the correct vocabulary. Nor are they the custodian of infallible folk wisdom. Common sense produced errors and injustices for centuries that also seemed obvious. This citizen is simply one of the central subjects of any democracy: someone capable of being wrong, prejudiced, reasoning badly and using deficient categories, exactly like the people who publish books, teach seminars and write public policy.

But they also formulate reasonable objections in imperfect words.

If those defending open societies stop answering those objections because they are not expressed in the correct language, others will answer them. And they will not merely acknowledge that some intuition was legitimate. They will offer a complete narrative of the confusion: they will explain who is to blame, which rights went too far, which institutions were captured and which people should be returned to the place they supposedly never should have left. That is the political problem analyses of reaction often miss: not everyone who ends up using reactionary language began from a reactionary ontology. Between one and the other lies a space of capture.

That space is occupied precisely by people who had already internalised the most difficult political premise long ago: let others live.

Losing them is not the inevitable price of progress; it is simply its principal stupidity.

References

  1. Butler, J. (1990). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge.
  2. Butler, J. (1993). Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. Routledge.
  3. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2022). Measuring Sex, Gender Identity, and Sexual Orientation. The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/26424
  4. Prosser, J. (1998). Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality. Columbia University Press.
  5. Namaste, V. K. (2000). Invisible Lives: The Erasure of Transsexual and Transgendered People. University of Chicago Press.
  6. Mason, L. (2018). Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. University of Chicago Press.
  7. Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019). “The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States.” Annual Review of Political Science, 22, 129–146.
  8. Törnberg, P. (2022). “How Digital Media Drive Affective Polarization Through Partisan Sorting.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119(42), e2207159119.
  9. Sunstein, C. R. (2017). #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton University Press.
  10. Mill, J. S. (1859/2003). On Liberty. Yale University Press.
  11. Berlin, I. (1969). “Two Concepts of Liberty.” In Four Essays on Liberty, 118–172. Oxford University Press.
  12. Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press.
  13. Coleman, E., Radix, A. E., Bouman, W. P., et al. (2022). “Standards of Care for the Health of Transgender and Gender Diverse People, Version 8.” International Journal of Transgender Health, 23(Suppl. 1), S1–S259.
  14. Madrigal-Borloz, V. (2021). The Law of Inclusion (A/HRC/47/27). United Nations Human Rights Council.
  15. Clarke, J. A. (2022). “Sex Assigned at Birth.” Columbia Law Review, 122(7), 1821–1898.
  16. Levendusky, M. S. (2009). The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans. University of Chicago Press.
  17. Bullock, O. M., Colón Amill, D., Shulman, H. C., & Dixon, G. N. (2019). “Jargon as a Barrier to Effective Science Communication: Evidence from Metacognition.” Public Understanding of Science, 28(7), 845–853.
  18. Cohen, G. L. (2003). “Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(5), 808–822.
  19. Barber, M., & Pope, J. C. (2019). “Does Party Trump Ideology? Disentangling Party and Ideology in America.” American Political Science Review, 113(1), 38–54.
  20. Brady, W. J., Wills, J. A., Jost, J. T., Tucker, J. A., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2017). “Emotion Shapes the Diffusion of Moralized Content in Social Networks.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(28), 7313–7318.
  21. Rathje, S., Van Bavel, J. J., & van der Linden, S. (2021). “Out-group Animosity Drives Engagement on Social Media.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(26), e2024292118.