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Three positions, one homosexual

After the Victory

Integration had a consequence that was easy to miss while the fight for rights was still on: once certain doors had been opened, there was no reason left for everyone to want to walk through them in the same way. As long as a homosexual was barred from marrying, marriage served as a reasonably tidy collective demand. Once it becomes a genuine option, a far less heroic question follows: do I actually want to?

Some do. They married, bought a house, adopted children, mastered the dialect of parents’ evenings and discovered they could spend twenty minutes debating which dog food was giving the dog wind. There are men who are perfectly happy there. The legal victory happened to coincide with the life they wanted, and it let them build that life without passing it off as an unusually close friendship with a gentleman who happened to sleep in the same bed every night.

Others won exactly the same right and never felt much curiosity about exercising it. Equal marriage mattered to them as a point of law; as a plan for their own lives it was neither here nor there. One can want a door to exist without the slightest wish to go through it. Such a man attends a friend’s wedding, buys a suit for the occasion, gets drunk in moderation at the reception and goes home with the pleasant certainty that nobody is waiting up to discuss who forgot the washing-up liquid. A shared right, it turns out, does not produce a shared way of living.

For much of the twentieth century, a series of institutions took it upon themselves to say what sort of person the homosexual was. Medicine spent decades treating him as a case, the law could make a criminal of him, and his family a source of shame. Once those classifications lost most of their power to organise an entire life, it became much plainer that homosexuals wanted different things.

In Virtually Normal, Andrew Sullivan [1] gave the integrationist project one of its clearest statements: full civil rights, marriage and entry into the common institutions, without turning homosexuality into a separate citizenship. The historical force of the argument was obvious. For decades the homosexual had been made to exist as an exception, and suddenly it was possible to imagine him as simply a neighbour, a husband, a father, a doctor, an accountant, or a man writing to the council because someone keeps parking across his drive.

Lisa Duggan [2] saw something else in part of that trajectory. Her critique of homonormativity was aimed at a gay politics domesticated around consumption, coupledom and private life, and less and less interested in disturbing the social arrangements that had gone hand in hand with exclusion. The quarrel between integration and normalisation was never settled, because in real life the two were thoroughly mixed up. There was genuine conquest, there was aspiration, and in certain circles there was a rather precise picture of what the homosexual who had arrived ought to look like.

Domestication is a seductive word because it supplies a victim at once. It works rather less well when the supposedly domesticated party is delighted with his lot. A man who waited years for the chance to marry his partner, and wanted children before the law would let him have them, does not need a theorist to drop by and inform him that he has capitulated to the bourgeois order. Another man will look at the same house, husband, child and dog and feel an almost clinical urge to run. To reduce homosexual freedom to the question of which of those lives is the authentic one would be to throw out one norm only to install another.

Once you step outside the exemplary biographies, things get untidy fast. One man devotes a decade to a partner, divorces, discovers an almost adolescent relish for being alone, and years later is laying on a children’s tea with a concentration he never brought to his doctoral thesis. Another settles into a long relationship and finds that stability has done nothing to dampen his desire for other men. Lives have little respect for the developmental stages we invent afterwards to explain them.

Legal integration finally turned a political question into a biographical one. At some point, however, certain biographies began to look suspiciously like the right answers.

Three Positions That Do Not Make Three People

The integrated man, the apostate and the disreputable man are useful figures only so long as nobody mistakes them for species. The first moves with relative ease inside the common institutions; the second refuses to have his sexual orientation delivered with a doctrine attached; the third holds on to an erotic territory ill suited to model citizenship or corporate diversity. All three can perfectly well share one body.

Three homosexual lives: family, sexuality and solitude.

Take a man who is married, has children and a thoroughly conventional profession. He disagrees with a good deal of what passes for received wisdom in certain LGBT circles, and he keeps up a sex life that would give whoever in HR designs the Diversity Week poster a minor coughing fit. The combination stops looking odd once you abandon the expectation that domestic, political and erotic life must slot together like parts of the same IKEA wardrobe.

A remarkably durable story imagines a progression from youthful promiscuity to adult stability. The homosexual grows up, gives up the clubs, finds a partner and at last learns which dinner service goes with the curtains. The romantic inversion of that story reads every wedding as a surrender and the dog in a Pride bandana as proof of defeat. The hero has changed; the insistence on a correct direction of travel has not.

Real lives are less instructive. Some men, after years of a very busy sex life, genuinely want a steady partner. Others try that life because it seems the obvious next step and find they cannot stand it. And then there are those who fail spectacularly at every model on offer and, with admirable persistence, blame the wrong one each time.

Marriage shows up the distance between institution and eroticism with particular clarity. It organises a shared household, property, care and emotional continuity; sex requires its own arrangements. A wedding ring has any number of legal properties. Nobody has yet found one that blocks dopamine receptors.

A husband who has sex outside the marriage has not thereby exposed his marriage as a sham. Sometimes there is an understanding; sometimes it is a perfectly ordinary betrayal. What takes the knock is the fantasy that the marital form comes with a particular organisation of desire built in. Heterosexuals had worked that out long before two men could sign a register together.

After decades of campaigning for it, part of gay life came to invest marriage with a weight well beyond its legal effects. It stood for recognition, for adulthood, for having arrived. The photograph was immaculate: two handsome men, a bright kitchen, a reasonably clean child, a golden retriever and a salad nobody shows the faintest intention of eating. We are given to understand that they are a couple; the picture would prefer we didn’t dwell on what they do about it once the child is asleep.

That image corrected some deeply hostile caricatures. For decades homosexual sex had been brandished as proof of moral incapacity: promiscuity, anal sex, cruising, leather, AIDS, effeminacy, cottaging, saunas. Against all that came couples, families, care and lasting bonds. The frame began to narrow when those images stopped widening what could be seen and started choosing which homosexual was easiest to defend.

Michael Warner [3] wrote The Trouble with Normal out of precisely that unease. For him sexual normalisation, marriage and shame were never separate matters: winning acceptance by accepting the line between respectable and indecent sex left intact a hierarchy that would simply come down on someone else. His critique overreaches when it treats certain forms of integration as suspect by definition, but he is right about how much political work respectability does.

The disreputable man stands just outside that photograph. Saunas, cruising, porn, leather, BDSM, fetish gear, darkrooms; sometimes a single fantasy suffices, one that would never make it into a company’s Pride Month brochure. Public homosexuality became steadily more narratable in the language of rights, love, discrimination, family and citizenship. None of which explains why one man looks at another and gets hard.

Respectability Has Many Doors

The husband, the child and the dog are only one of the forms on offer. Another begins with two letters in front of a surname.

Dr

A doctor has no need of a Hallmark life to be socially legible. The profession already supplies authority, presumed education, discipline and a clear institutional place. He may lead a private life that would thoroughly disconcert the people who call him ‘doctor’ at nine in the morning, and still come in through the front door the next day.

Respectability is accumulated piecemeal. Money helps, and so does education; certain accents do a great deal of work without announcing it. Two men with much the same sexual habits are read quite differently when one of them has credentials that enter the room a few seconds ahead of him.

Which is why integrated falls short when it is made to describe a whole person. A doctor occupies a central institution and then takes part in a sexual scene that the same institution would never feature in its staff wellbeing leaflet. A university lecturer gives a seminar on poetry and later drops into a sauna. Nobody is obliged to decide which of the two scenes reveals the truth about him.

A doctor between his professional role and a male sauna.

The fantasy of a perfectly legible life requires a good deal of editing. Respectable work, a suitable partner, sex kept within bounds, sensible hobbies; even rebellion is admitted, provided it keeps to tasteful proportions and turns up in June carrying a flag.

Sexual spaces undo that editing with an ease that borders on the rude. A married man walks into a sauna, leaves his clothes and his phone in a locker, and for a few hours his CV counts for remarkably little. Nobody asks him what model of family he represents.

Traffic in the other direction sometimes brings more vetting. An old companion from parties and hook-ups becomes an embarrassment once his friend reorganises his life around a partner or a family. The invitations to certain dinners dry up. He starts to acquire that marvellous label from late adolescence: a bad influence. Often the real reason is duller: less free time, new habits, a jealous partner.

Hypocrisy begins when someone publicly condemns in others what he privately keeps for himself. The disreputable man ends up carrying a piece of another man’s life, one that the other needs to declare over and done with.

In Thinking Sex, Gayle Rubin [4] had already sketched a comparable cultural hierarchy: married, monogamous, domestic sex near the centre; promiscuity, fetishism, pornography and whatever falls outside that frame pushed out towards the zones of suspicion. The map was deliberately schematic. Its value lies less in memorising every box than in spotting a remarkably stubborn cultural need to produce good sex, even as the boundary, and the vocabulary used to justify it, move over time.

Desire Doesn’t Teach

A gay man puts on a corset, fishnets and a thong to meet a man who enjoys playing at an exaggerated masculinity. In the scene, one plays at being feminised and the other at being the brute; there are orders, there is abuse, and there is an iconography no gender-equality committee would ever pass unanimously. After he comes, the corset ends up draped over a chair. The next morning neither of them feels any need to amend his civil identity.

Erotic feminisation, leather and exaggerated masculinity.

The scene invites interpretation, and no doubt it is made of cultural material about masculinity, femininity, power and shame. From outside, the temptation to turn that material into a total explanation is considerable.

To claim that such a practice proves a repressed gender identity produces a curious paradox: someone who holds that identity belongs to the subject’s inner experience ends up discovering another person’s true identity from his visible behaviour.

The political reading tends to come in by another door. The fantasy reproduces stereotypes, perpetuates hierarchies, restores the macho to a position of dominance. So the bed is put on trial, and clothes, vocabulary and positions are made to answer for what they would supposedly stand for in social life. But the symbolic content of a fantasy is one thing and its normative content quite another.

The supposedly dominant man may well be carrying out, with great diligence, precisely the script demanded by the one in the submissive position. ‘Do as I say’ is exactly what the other one wanted to hear. The bed is a rather poor place from which to derive a manifesto.

Psychoanalysis has worked with this gap between consciousness, fantasy and jouissance for far too long to be surprised by it. Carmen González Táboas [5] puts it in a phrase whose worth lies in what it unsettles rather than in any diagnostic use: jouissance, she says, stays hidden behind ideals. The integrated man can hide behind the ideal of stability; the self-declared dissident can easily discover the pleasure of imagining that he alone sees through the imposture. Nor is the disreputable man immune from turning his own life into a certificate of authenticity.

Bersani [6] is particularly awkward company at this point. In ‘Is the Rectum a Grave?’ and later in Homos, sex largely loses its ability to serve as the edifying confirmation of a sovereign identity. Some sexual experiences disorganise the self; they bring passivity, exposure and loss of control, and hurrying to translate them into political virtue hands them back the very respectability the analysis set out to disturb. Nor does an arse acquire dignity by correctly representing a theory.

Edelman [7] takes the gesture to a further extreme. In No Future, the figure of the Child gathers up a promise of futurity in whose name politics demands that everything justify itself. Queerness deliberately takes the position of whatever promises no redemption, no continuity and no edifying contribution to what is to come.

When Queer Learns Its Manners Too

Much of queer theory was born attacking over-comfortable identities, sexual hierarchies and models of respectability. Warner [3] distrusted normalisation, Rubin [4] had shown how respectable sex was manufactured, Bersani [6] refused to make sexuality a moral affirmation of the self, and Edelman [7] turned political uselessness into something close to a methodological provocation.

In time, certain institutionalised strands of queer vocabulary developed a far more pedagogical relationship with desire. What counts is which identities it recognises, which bodies it includes, which stereotypes it reproduces and which political reading it permits. Transgression is still welcome; it simply arrives, on occasion, with instructions for use.

A corset earns an emancipatory reading when it subverts gender, and may receive a much less favourable one inside a sexual fantasy judged too masculine or too hierarchical. Context changes the meaning of a practice, naturally, but it is striking how readily an erotic scene finds itself in the dock awaiting a political verdict.

Exclusively homosexual desire is particularly ill equipped for that sort of work. Some bodies arouse it and others don’t. It keeps no quotas and has no interest in balanced representation. Happily, an erection is not in charge of a public body.

If sex was meant to be freed from the obligation to look normal, it is hard to see why it should now be obliged to look correct.

The Apostate

Legal integration made it possible to imagine a homosexual as simply one more citizen. In certain circles, political belonging then brought further expectations with it. Orientation started to work as a clue to one’s views on gender, language, feminism and a range of other matters that do not come packaged with desire for people of the same sex.

Apostate names something more specific than voting the other way. It applies when disagreement is taken as betrayal of a community whose membership is assumed to come with a creed.

A man does not become homosexual by subscribing to certain principles. He may discover his desire long before he knows what left, right, queer theory or feminism mean; the political expectations come later, and have to be learnt.

Which is why symbolic expulsions have something comic about them. The apostate goes on desiring men. He may drift away from the organisations, reject their vocabulary, or end up at daggers drawn with those who claim to speak for him; no assembly can alter the object of his desire, and the expelled man remains every bit as homosexual as before.

The thoroughly integrated married man may be a dissident within the LGBT movement. The most promiscuous man in town may recite every expected position with impeccable discipline. The bed gave up whipping votes a long time ago.

Queer theory has a great deal to say about how a society classifies, regulates and narrates sexualities. Its tools become less persuasive once the historicity of the categories starts to be confused with the political availability of the erotic object.

At this point the homosexual turns out to be a rather crude limit. There is something in him he did not choose, and may never fully manage to explain. He can organise half his life around it or treat it as a fairly banal fact. The direction of his desire remains remarkably indifferent to the quality of his arguments.

Out of Frame

What is left is a scene far simpler than any taxonomy. A man comes off a shift, takes off his scrubs, stops being ‘doctor’ for a few hours and goes out. Another has just put his son to bed and opens Grindr. Someone comes home alone after a night of sex and enjoys the quiet. None of these lives owes anyone a definitive version of homosexuality.

Bersani [6] and Edelman [7] left inside queer thought a kind of sex that resists being made good. Duggan [2] grew suspicious of integration once it began to be mistaken for destiny. Rubin [4] had warned that every age draws up, with remarkable enthusiasm, its own charmed circle of respectable sexualities. Those tools lose none of their usefulness when turned on what later came to be called queer; that may well be where they recover some of their edge.

For years the homosexual was asked to prove that his desire did not make him sick, criminal, sinful or dangerous. Later he was able to show that he could marry, work, raise children and lead a recognisable life. None of that obliges desire to mind its manners, to acquire a correct theory of itself or to justify politically the body it goes looking for.

There are men who desire men and women who desire women. Then come the names, the coalitions, the theories, the programmes, the flags and the arguments about what it is all supposed to mean. Desire, meanwhile, carries on regardless.

References

  1. Sullivan, A. (1995) Virtually Normal: An Argument About Homosexuality. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. ↩ Back
  2. Duggan, L. (2003) The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press. ↩ Back: a b
  3. Warner, M. (1999) The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life. New York: Free Press. ↩ Back: a b
  4. Rubin, G. (1984) ‘Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality’, in Vance, C. S. (ed.) Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 267–319. ↩ Back: a b c
  5. González Táboas, C. — Lacanian psychoanalyst (author of Semblantes de Occidente, 2009, and Querida María. Cuando el psicoanálisis no es un sueño). Remark made in a talk available on YouTube. ↩ Back
  6. Bersani, L. (1987) ‘Is the Rectum a Grave?’, October, 43, pp. 197–222; Bersani, L. (1995) Homos. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ↩ Back: a b c
  7. Edelman, L. (2004) No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. ↩ Back: a b c