Erection as Response and the Limits of Self-Identification

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From the Body I Desire to the Body from Which I Desire

We all knew that boy. He cried when he was told off. He ran in a way that drew comment, and he would rather stay indoors at break than be picked last for football and first for ridicule. He grew up on a vocabulary any man could recite in his sleep: man up, big boys don't cry, stop being such a girl, you throw like a girl. His father said it, his classmates said it, and the PE teacher said it with all the authority a whistle can confer. He spent a good part of his life under suspicion of not being man enough.

And yet there was one thing nobody ever doubted, not for a moment: that he was a man. The insult depended on it. You can only reproach a boy for falling short of a condition he already has; no one would dream of telling a little girl to man up. The taunt presupposes precisely what it pretends to call into question. He was accused of failing at something, and one has to be inside a thing in order to fail at it.

That scene contains a paradox our culture has carried for centuries without pausing to look at it. Men are required to earn a condition they already possess and cannot lose by failing. Masculinity works rather like an examination, complete with its tests, its examiners and its resits. Being a man does not. One can fail masculinity in its entirety and walk out of the examination hall every bit as much a man as one walked in. Be cowardly, delicate, submissive, gay, hairless, or hopeless with a screwdriver; it makes no difference. Society can strip someone of the title of "real man", but it has no jurisdiction whatsoever over what that title purported to certify.

In earlier essays I dealt with the other half of the question: what a woman is, and why self-identification is not enough to become one. In Homosexual Means Same Sex I tried to describe how desire anticipates the sexed body of the other, the body I desire. That essay left a question in its shadow that it never quite got round to asking: the question of the body from which I desire. The erection made a brief appearance there as the male body's blush, a sign whose value lies precisely in its not having been produced on purpose. What was then a single chapter now becomes the axis. It is the same inquiry, seen from the other side of the mirror.

There is also a matter of honesty in this turn. If the arguments I made about women held only when applied to women, one would be entitled to suspect them. A theory that works exclusively on the half of humanity one does not inhabit is a rather comfortable thing to hold.

There is an epistemic difference, too, which I have no wish to disguise. When I wrote about women, I wrote about a body I know only by appresentation, as one always knows another's body: through its signs, its behaviour, what others say of it. Here I am writing about the body I happened to be given, and from the inside. For the first time in this series, the phenomenologist and the phenomenon coincide.

The question, then, is not who belongs to the category of man. The sexed body settled that long ago, and there is no need to trouble it again. The question is a different and harder one: what it is, lived from within, to be a male body. Every man recognises something as his own that no social role, no beard, no musculature and no tally of conquests contains. What is it?

My answer is that the core of that experience lies in something far less heroic than masculinity. It lies in a body that answers the sexed body of another without asking consciousness for permission. It answers before judgement and before language, before the subject has even worked out what he thinks of whoever is standing in front of him.

From that answer follows the thesis this essay sets out to defend: self-identification can neither produce the lived experience of the male body nor abolish it. A woman does not acquire it by declaring herself a man. A man does not shed it by declaring himself a woman. A faculty that can neither create a thing nor destroy it can hardly be its foundation.

The title, therefore, is not ironic. It is a perfectly literal question, and it has an answer. The answer is given by the body of the man who does not identify as one, every time it reacts exactly as any of ours would.

A misunderstanding ought to be headed off at once. I shall not define a man by his erection. A man who never had one, or who has lost it, does not thereby cease to be a man, and a good part of this essay is concerned with showing why. The erection is not offered here as a criterion of membership. It is the most audible voice of a condition that precedes it: the place where the male body says out loud what it is, without consulting its owner.

That leaves the question of method. What follows is first-person phenomenology, occasionally in the singular and mostly in the plural. I know my own body by originary intuition. Of another's body, whether a man's or a woman's, I have only the indirect presentation Husserl called appresentation.[1] I shall not, therefore, claim to know how anyone lives their own body. I shall claim structures: what the body does regardless of the meaning its owner gives it.

And when I say "we men", I shall not be citing a statistic but extending an invitation. Any man reading these pages can check what I say against his own body, without intermediaries. Should he fail to recognise himself in them, the essay will have failed. It is, in its way, a falsifiable phenomenology, and I can think of few theories of gender that offer themselves up for refutation quite so readily.

Clearing the Ground: Masculinity Is Not Being a Man

Before describing what the male body is from the inside, we need to clear off the stage whatever is usually mistaken for it. Masculinity is the set of behaviours, gestures, tastes, skills and attitudes a culture associates with men. It is not the same thing as being a man. This sounds obvious, yet a good deal of the noise in the current debate comes from treating the two as synonyms. The error is, moreover, shared. It is made by whoever thinks a delicate man is less of a man, and equally by whoever thinks a bearded woman is more of one.

The first difference is that masculinity comes in degrees and being a man does not. It makes perfect sense to say one man is more masculine than another; it makes no sense at all to say he is more male. The vernacular seems to muddle this, since "more of a man than you'll ever be" is a perfectly ordinary insult. But whoever says it is measuring conduct, never the body. Nobody supposes that the winner of an arm-wrestle has accumulated more sex than the loser. What comes in degrees can be measured. What does not, one simply is.

The second difference is that masculinity is learnt. Iris Marion Young showed this with uncomfortable precision in Throwing Like a Girl.[2] The way one throws a ball, occupies space, walks or sits does not spring from one's sex like a reflex; it is acquired, corrected and punished. The boy from the previous section ran oddly because he had not learnt, or had declined to learn, the bodily style his surroundings demanded. Whatever is learnt can go unlearnt, can be unlearnt, and can be imitated. That is why masculinity can be imitated, and why it can also be revoked: the same surroundings that teach it can withdraw it with a sneer.

The third difference matters most for what follows. We must distinguish between what constitutes a condition and what allows it to be recognised from outside. Beards, deep voices, musculature and the distribution of body hair are secondary sexual characteristics. The male body tends to produce them, which is why they work as signs: at a distance, in the street, they let us guess someone's sex with reasonable accuracy. But a sign is not the thing it signifies. Medicine knows this by heart. A man with hypogonadism may reach adulthood hairless, high-voiced and without muscle mass, and he remains a man. A woman with hyperandrogenism may grow a beard, and she remains a woman; no endocrinologist would think otherwise. The sign may be absent where the condition is present, and present where the condition is absent. It is a good clue, never a proof.

Put the three differences together and masculinity falls into place. It is a cultural repertoire of conduct that is graded, learnt and imitable, resting partly on bodily signs that sex tends to produce but does not consist in. None of this is to be sneezed at. Masculinity organises lives, produces pride and suffering, and deserves a philosophy of its own. It simply is not the philosophy of this essay.

Before going on, I should like to make a concession, explicitly and without haggling. Gender theorists are right when they say there is no single way of being a man. There is not. The man who embroiders and the man who lifts weights, the one who weeps at the cinema and the one who did not weep at his father's funeral, the one who desires women and the one who desires men, the one who paints his nails and the one who has never heard of varnish: all of them are men, and none is more so than another. No attribute of masculinity is necessary for being a man. I sign that sentence without reservation.

It is worth holding on to, however, because a concession binds the one who receives it as much as the one who makes it. If no trait of masculinity is necessary for being a man, we shall have to ask, further on, what exactly is being sought when, in order to become one, it is precisely those traits that are pursued. For now it is enough to have cleared the ground. What we wish to describe lies not in conduct, nor in style, nor in signs. It lies elsewhere, lower down and further in.

The Body That Answers

Every man remembers some version of this scene. He is thirteen or fourteen and sitting in class. Nothing in particular has happened; perhaps a girl leant across the desk, perhaps not even that. His body, without consulting him, produces an erection. The teacher calls him up to the board. Then the bell goes and everyone gets up except him. He stays seated, rearranging an already tidy bag, an exercise book placed strategically across his lap.

Nobody taught him that technique. He invented it himself, as we all did, each of us on our own and each of us identically. The same goes for the erection he wakes up with every morning without having dreamt of anything, and for the nocturnal emission that has him changing the sheets on the quiet. The adolescent body has a sexual life of its own, one that carries on even while the self is asleep.

An empty traditional classroom in warm afternoon light, with a schoolbook on a desk.

This is how a man discovers that he is a male sexed body. It is not through a declaration but through a surprise, and quite often through embarrassment. The body arrives first. The self's narrative turns up afterwards, trying to account for something that has already happened.

Phenomenology has a name for this order of arrival. In Experience and Judgment[3], Husserl describes a layer of experience prior to all judgement, a realm of the passively pregiven on which the subject will later build his predications. The erection belongs to that layer. It is not a judgement of the form "this person attracts me", nor the consequence of one. Quite often it is its premise: a man frequently learns what he desires by noticing that his body has already answered.

This reverses the order we tend to assume, in which we first desire and the body then carries out instructions. Here the body responds, and only then does the subject find out what he wanted. In that sense, the male body serves as an informant to its own owner.

It would be a mistake to conclude that the erection is a mere reflex, like the knee's response to the hammer. If it were, it would have nothing to tell us. Merleau-Ponty devoted a chapter of the Phenomenology of Perception, "The Body in Its Sexual Being"[4], to showing that sexuality is neither a reflex arc nor a mental representation. It is an intentionality of the body, a way of perceiving the other that bypasses thought.

His example is Schneider, a brain-injured patient for whom bodies had lost their erotic physiognomy. He still saw bodies, but not as desirable, and his sexual initiative had faded. What Schneider lost was neither a reflex nor an idea but a form of bodily perception. The erection is the visible manifestation of that perception when it is intact: the body understands the other in its own fashion before the subject understands it in his. And when it occurs without any object, as in sleep, the body seems to be rehearsing that same capacity to respond in the dark.

In Homosexual Means Same Sex I called the erection the male body's blush, a sign whose value lies in its not having been produced on purpose. The analogy stands, but it is now worth noting where it falls short. A blush rises to the face. The erection has something more radical, which is its exteriority. A man's sex is on the outside, and its response is an event in the world, visible to him and potentially to anyone. Hence the exercise book. For many men, the first experience of a body betraying the self is precisely this: an unsigned confession, put on display in the least discreet place imaginable.

It is, moreover, a confession the will governs in neither direction. It cannot be produced at will, as any man acquainted with performance anxiety knows, nor suppressed at will, as any adolescent knows. Augustine had already noticed as much in The City of God.[5] Of all the members of the body, he observed, the male member alone disobeyed the will, sometimes refusing when summoned and sometimes rising when nobody had called. Augustine read that disobedience as punishment for original sin. It can be read otherwise: as the most eloquent proof that the body has a say of its own in the matter.

One feature of that voice matters particularly: it does not depend on the object. The body of a heterosexual man before a woman and that of a homosexual man before another man answer with the same response, the same involuntariness and the same exposure. What is male lies not in what is desired but in the body that responds. That is why the homosexual is fully a man in the sense this essay is concerned with, even as masculinity as a role, the one of the previous section, penalises him. In the earlier essay, the sex of the object mattered for understanding desire. Here, the sex of the subject matters for understanding the response.

There remains an obvious objection: involuntary genital response is not exclusive to men. The clitoris has erectile tissue homologous to that of the penis, and tumescence and lubrication occur without the will's involvement, even during sleep. I concede this readily. The mechanism is shared.

What is not shared is legibility. A meta-analysis by Meredith Chivers and colleagues pooled 132 laboratory studies covering some 2,500 women and 1,900 men. It found that the correlation between measured genital response and reported arousal was 0.66 in men and a mere 0.26 in women.[6] Among the explanations the literature itself puts forward for that gap is, precisely, the exteriority of male genitals. On average, a woman's body may respond without her finding out. A man's body responds, and he cannot fail to find out. For phenomenology, which concerns itself with what is given to consciousness and how it is given, the difference is decisive. The male response is not merely a physiological fact. It is a fact of experience that imposes itself.

We can now say more precisely what it is, lived from within, to be a male body. It is to be a body whose sexual response arrives before the self; which the self can neither produce nor suppress; which the self cannot ignore; and which others can see. Anteriority, involuntariness, legibility, exteriority. This is not a definition of man but a description of the lived male body. If the description is right, its failure ought to tell us something too: what a man loses when he loses that response is precisely what that response was. That is the subject of the next section.

Privation Reveals

Any doctor knows it: few consultations arrive wrapped in as much embarrassment as that of the man who has stopped having erections. He circles the subject, mentions tiredness, stress, pressure at work, and only at the door, hand already on the handle, says what he actually came for. The distress he brings is out of all proportion to its practical consequences. It afflicts men in steady relationships and men with no partner whatsoever, men of twenty-five and men of seventy, widowers with no intention of ever sleeping with anyone again. Were this a matter of prestige, of the alpha male losing a trophy in front of others, the widower with no plans would have nothing to worry about. And yet he worries. What distresses him is not what others might think, but the silence of his own body: the body that used to answer has stopped answering.

In Being and Time (§16)[7], Heidegger described a phenomenon that sheds more light on this distress than any urology textbook. While a piece of equipment works, we do not see it. The hammer, in the hand of the one hammering, disappears into the hammering; nobody thinks about the hammer while driving in a nail. Only when the hammer breaks, goes missing or gets in the way does it become conspicuous and show itself for what it was. The failure does not destroy our relation to the tool; it reveals it.

The erection works in exactly this way. While it occurs normally, a man does not make it a theme; he takes it for granted, as he takes for granted that he sees or breathes. The first time it fails, it becomes visible all at once. And in that sudden visibility a man discovers that his body had been in conversation with the world all along, and that this conversation formed part of how he lived himself.

That is what erectile dysfunction teaches us about the previous section. Were the body's involuntary response an accessory, one performance among others, losing it would be an inconvenience. That its loss is lived as an amputation of the self proves that it was no such thing. Privation shows the essence through the hole it leaves behind.

We must, however, be precise about what kind of lack this is, and for that it is worth returning to a distinction a great deal older than Heidegger. Aristotle distinguished between mere absence and privation, steresis (Metaphysics Δ 22; Categories 10).[8] Not every lack is a privation. A stone does not see, but no one would call it blind: blindness is predicated only of what ought by nature to see. Privation is not simply not having; it is not having what belongs to the nature of the one who lacks it. Only that which has a nature the lack contradicts can be deprived.

A large bronze school bell seen from below, hanging inside a wooden bell tower.

Applied to our problem, the result is clear-cut. Impotence is a privation: it is predicated of a body organised for erection which, for whatever reason, fails to achieve it. An impotent man does not thereby cease to be a man. On the contrary, only a male body can be impotent in this sense, just as only an eye can be blind. Impotence confirms the very nature it negates. To have lost it implies having had it, or at least having been made to have it.

That last qualification matters, because primary erectile dysfunction exists: men who, almost always for organic reasons, have never achieved a full and sustained erection. They have lost nothing they once had. And yet Aristotle covers them without effort, since privation does not require one to have possessed what one lacks, only to be naturally destined to possess it. The puppy that has not yet opened its eyes is not blind; the dog that never will, is. The man with primary dysfunction experiences his lack as a lack, consults about it and suffers it as something that ought to be there and is not. It is his body, not his opinion, that establishes what he is missing.

Medicine, for its part, has absorbed this structure without needing to read Aristotle. Phosphodiesterase-5 inhibitors, the sildenafil family, do not produce erections. Without sexual stimulation they do nothing at all. What they do is make it easier for the body to give the answer it was already disposed to give: they amplify a response of the body's own; they do not replace it. Even pharmacology respects the body's anteriority. The pill does not command; it lets the body speak.

When none of this suffices, there remains the penile prosthesis: hydraulic cylinders implanted in the penis, which the patient inflates by means of a pump housed in the scrotum. Here a case arises that deserves careful attention, because the same device can occupy two entirely different ontological positions.

In the man who has lost erectile function, the prosthesis replaces an absent function in a body organised for it. It is a crutch: it supplies what the body's nature demanded and no longer delivers. The man with a prosthesis remains a man deprived of something, and the prosthesis is the technical answer to that privation. His condition does not change; what changes is his ability to exercise it.

In the neophallus constructed by phalloplasty, the same cylinder serves a different purpose. It does not replace a lost response; it is the only rigidity that organ will ever have. Without it there is no impotent penis, merely a tube of tissue that was never meant to rise. From this follows something that sounds like provocation and is pure Aristotelian logic: a neophallus cannot suffer from erectile dysfunction. There is no nature for the lack to contradict, and therefore no privation. When it fails, what fails is the mechanism, not the organ. The prosthesis breaks down; it does not fall ill.

The same hydraulic cylinder is, in one case, a prosthesis, and in the other, the entire organ. The difference lies not in the device but in the body that receives it.

We thus arrive at a conclusion the next section will need. The male body's response reveals itself not only when it occurs but also when it is absent. And its absence has a precise grammar: it can only be missing where it belonged. Where there is no nature, there is no privation. Where there is no privation, there is no loss. And no one can lose, recover, or acquire by declaration something that never formed part of the nature of their body.

First Dissociation: Identity Does Not Produce the Experience

In section 2 I made a concession and promised to collect on it. The moment has come. Gender theorists hold, rightly, that there is no single way of being a man and that no attribute of masculinity is necessary for being one. A man may be hairless, high-voiced, frail or delicate and remain a man. I signed that sentence. It is now worth looking at what, concretely, is sought when a woman sets out to become a man.

Testosterone is sought, so that the beard grows, the voice deepens, the muscles develop and the fat redistributes. A mastectomy is sought, so that the chest is flat. Binders are worn while the surgery is pending, and packers in the underwear so that a bulge may be guessed at beneath the trousers. And at the far end of the road, phalloplasty is sought. The inventory is almost exact: it is the list of signs from section 2, plus the shape of the organ. The content of becoming a man consists precisely of what all of us, including those who champion transition, agree does not make a man.

If no trait of masculinity is necessary, why is transition made up entirely of such traits?

There are two customary replies, and both confirm the thesis rather than refute it. The first is recognition: the traits serve so that others see a man. The community's own vocabulary says as much without embarrassment. A trans man who manages to be taken for male is said to "pass". To pass as something, in English as in Spanish, is to be taken for what one is not; nobody says that a man passes as a man. The word concedes, in its very grammar, that what is obtained is a being-seen-as.

The second reply is relief from distress: dysphoria diminishes as the body comes to resemble the subject's self-image. This may well be true, and it is not this essay's business to pass judgement on that relief. But relief is a fact about someone's suffering, not about what that someone is. That an intervention makes a person feel better does not turn the person into what they wish to be, any more than a toupee gives a bald man back his hair, however much it may console him in the mirror.

Neither reply reaches what section 3 described. And here precision is required, because it is easy to err on the side of excess.

Testosterone has real effects on the female body. It heightens sexual desire and enlarges the clitoris, which may become more visible and respond more intensely. Many trans men describe an arousal more urgent than any they had known before. There is no reason to deny it. But it is worth looking at what, exactly, is responding. It is a clitoris: a female organ with its own erectile tissue, intensified by a hormone. Section 3 has already conceded that women have an involuntary genital response; testosterone does not create it, it amplifies it. What results is a stronger female response, not a male one.

The grammar of privation from section 4 confirms this from another angle. That enlarged clitoris, even when surgically fashioned into a small phallus by metoidioplasty, has a nature. It can be deprived, but only of what belongs to its nature, which is clitoral function. What it can never lose is penile erection, because penile erection was never its own. It can suffer the failure of a clitoris; it cannot suffer the impotence of a penis. And the neophallus, as we have seen, cannot suffer at all. It can only break.

The decisive argument, however, is not anatomical but temporal. Recall the classroom: a thirteen-year-old boy taken by surprise by his own body, hiding behind an exercise book something he did not ask for, does not entirely understand and cannot stop. His body speaks to him before he knows what to say. Now consider the other route. The trans man arrives at the signs of masculinity in adulthood, deliberately, syringe in hand and a dosing schedule on the fridge. The order of events is reversed.

In male puberty, the body writes upon the self. In transition, the self attempts to write upon the body.

A man writes black ink on a mirror that reflects his face.

It will be said that the reversal is not so tidy. Once testosterone has begun, the trans man's body surprises him too: arousals he did not ask for, tumescence he did not decide upon, responses that get ahead of him. Quite true. And it will be said, further, that there are hypogonadal boys whose puberty is induced with testosterone on a date chosen by an endocrinologist, and nobody would suggest that their erections are any the less male for it. Also true. But the two cases, far from weakening the argument, show precisely where it lies.

In both cases the will decides when something begins. What it does not decide is what answers. In the hypogonadal boy, the hormone finds a penis organised for erection and allows it to do what its nature had always provided for. It does for puberty what sildenafil does for the erection: it does not command; it lets the body speak. In the trans man, the same hormone finds a clitoris, and lets that speak too, in the only voice it has, which is a clitoris's. The surprises that follow are real, but they are surprises from the body one has, not the one one has declared. The syringe can make the body speak; it cannot choose the language in which it will do so.

That is the anteriority that matters. It is an anteriority not of the calendar but of nature: what answers was there before any decision, and no decision can stand in for it. Identity can initiate processes, hasten them, construct signs and even organs. What it cannot do is replace whatever it is in the body that responds. Self-identification cannot produce an experience whose essence is not to be produced by the self. This is not a limitation of present-day medicine that some future technique might overcome. It is a logical limit.

Thus the first dissociation is established. A declared male identity is not enough to produce the lived experience of the male body, not for want of resources, but because that experience is precisely what no declaration can produce. It remains to be seen whether the converse holds: whether a declared identity, when it contradicts the body, can suppress that experience where it already exists.

Second Dissociation: Identity Does Not Suppress the Experience

We come now to the case that gives this essay its title. A man declares himself a woman. He may or may not have begun hormone treatment, but he retains his penis. Faced with a body that arouses him, his body responds. It responds exactly as any other man's would: before judgement, without asking leave, in a way he can neither produce nor halt at will, cannot ignore, and others might see. The four features of section 3 are met one by one. Whether the desire is for men or for women makes no difference; as we have seen, the response does not depend on its object. The subject says "I am a woman", and the body, in the only language it has, goes on saying something else.

The methodological limit I set at the outset must be recalled here. I have no originary access to that experience, only the appresentation one has of any other body. I shall not claim to know how a trans woman lives it, whether with pleasure, indifference or revulsion. What I claim is a structure. The response occurs with the same features as in any man, whatever meaning the subject gives it. And that meaning may be anything at all, including the very opposite of what the response appears to express.

That last case, the case of the opposite meaning, is the most revealing. Many trans women describe their erections as intrusive, alien, a betrayal of identity by the body. It is among the most frequently cited features of dysphoria, and it deserves to be taken seriously, because it is the strongest argument in this section. If identity constituted the lived body, if declaring oneself a woman sufficed to live one's own body as a woman's, there would be nothing to suffer against. The distress exists because the declaration runs up against something that will not obey it. Dysphoria is the friction between what the self says and what the body carries on doing. It is, paradoxically, the most eloquent testimony to the thesis: the male response imposes itself even against the express will of the one who undergoes it.

One detail makes this almost literal. Many trans women practise what the community calls tucking: concealing the penis and testicles between the legs, held in place with tape or tight garments, so that nothing shows beneath the clothes. Return to the classroom of section 3, to the thirteen-year-old with an exercise book across his lap, waiting for it to pass. The gesture is the same. In both cases someone is hiding a body that speaks without permission. The difference is that the adolescent hides it from others, while the trans woman hides it from herself as well. But hiding presupposes that there is something to hide. Identity does not suppress the response; at most, it covers it up.

There remains, admittedly, the chemical route. Anti-androgens and oestrogens reduce libido and erections, sometimes to the point of their disappearance. Identity, then, can silence the body. But it is worth looking at how it does so, and at what it obtains.

First, how. The declaration silences nothing. What silences is a drug acting upon the body. Identity on its own has no power whatsoever over the response; it must delegate the task to chemistry or to the scalpel. That is already a concession: the self acknowledges that its word is not enough, and that in order to quieten the body it must intervene upon it with the same weapons medicine uses on any other organ.

Second, what it obtains. Here the grammar of section 4 is merciless. A penis that ceases to become erect under anti-androgens does not turn into a female organ; it is deprived of its function. And privation, as we saw with Aristotle, is predicated only of what ought by nature to have what it lacks. What the treatment produces is not a woman's body. It is an impotent male body. The same logic applies, all the more so, to orchiectomy and vaginoplasty: what is removed is lost, and only what one had can be lost. Identity manages to suppress the male experience only in the form of a male privation. The silence it obtains is the silence of a man.

It may be objected that what is sought is not a female experience but simply an end to an unwanted male one, and that in this sense the treatment achieves its aim. Granted. But then the objection concedes everything this essay asserts. If the most identity can do with the male body is to silence it rather than transform it, then the male body owed identity nothing: it was there first, it spoke in spite of it, and when it falls silent, it falls silent as what it always was.

The two dissociations now stand side by side. In section 5, a declared male identity could not produce the lived experience of the male body, because that experience is defined by not being produced by the self. Here, a declared female identity cannot by itself suppress that experience. It can only conceal it with tape or silence it with chemistry, and in either case what it obtains confirms what it denies. A faculty that can neither create a thing nor destroy it, and can at most cover it up or mutilate it, is not its foundation. Self-identification is not the foundation of the lived male body.

And the question in the title finds its answer. What does it mean to be a man if you don't identify as one? It means having a body that goes on answering as a man's does while the self says otherwise, and whose silence, if silence is achieved, can only ever be the silence of a man.

Objections, Briefly Entertained

Having made one's case, one ought to hear the prosecution. What follows are the objections an intelligent critic would raise, put in their strongest form, since defeating a feeble version of one's opponent is a victory of rather limited distinction.

Objection one: "man" names a social category, not a sexed body.

The most sophisticated reply grants everything the preceding sections have said about the body and simply declines to let it bear on the word. "Man", it says, names a social position: an identity, a way of being addressed and treated. The lived body is another matter entirely, and the essay has been describing the wrong thing.

One answer is that this essay never set out to legislate the word. It described the body, and an objection that concedes the description has conceded the essay. But the objection deserves rather more than a shrug.

Recall the concession of section 2, which the critic was happy to accept: no attribute of masculinity is necessary for being a man. Combine it with the social definition and see what remains. A man is not anyone with a beard, nor anyone with a deep voice, nor anyone who behaves in any particular fashion. A man, it turns out, is anyone who says he is one. The difficulty is that the word now appears on both sides of the definition. To declare oneself a man, one must already know what a man is, and the only thing the definition can offer by way of answer is the declaration itself. It is a cheque drawn on an account whose sole deposit is the cheque. There is, admittedly, an academic version of the social definition that does not run in this circle. It is serious enough to deserve a section of its own, and it gets one next.

Nor can the social view explain what section 5 laid bare. A category said to have no necessary content is pursued, with considerable expense and no small amount of surgery, entirely through its content.

Humpty Dumpty, it will be remembered, held that a word meant just what he chose it to mean, neither more nor less. When Alice wondered whether one could make words mean so many different things, he replied that the question was which is to be master.[9] On the social view, the self is master. This essay has spent six sections showing that, where the male body is concerned, the self is not even a tenant.

Humpty Dumpty, solemn and cracked, sitting on an old stone wall, raising one finger.

Objection two: the essay is phallocentric.

The charge runs that the essay reduces man to penis, and the penis to its erection. Phallocentrism is a grave accusation in certain faculties, roughly the equivalent of heresy in others. It is also, here, inaccurate. The essay explicitly declined to make the erection a criterion. It argued that the effeminate man, the impotent man and the man who has never managed an erection all remain men. The penis was presented not as the throne of manhood but as its loudest witness, the place where a male body says aloud what it is. To privilege a witness is not to mistake him for the defendant.

One might add, with as much delicacy as the point permits, that the charge comes oddly from that quarter. It is not this essay that treats the phallus as the culminating stage of becoming a man. It is the surgical itinerary of transition, which ends, when it goes all the way, with a constructed one. If anyone has made the phallus the measure of manhood, it was not the man who merely described his own.

Objection three: the essay generalises from one man's experience.

It is said that the essay extrapolates from its author to all men. There are two replies.

First, the "we" of this essay was never statistical. It was an invitation, extended to every male reader, to check the description against his own body. The description has been exposed to refutation on every page, and I await with interest the man who never stayed seated after the bell. Second, the empirical literature, insofar as it bears on the matter, points the same way: the concordance reported by Chivers and colleagues is a property of men as a group, not a confession of mine.

There is, besides, an asymmetry worth remarking upon. The theory that makes self-identification the foundation of being a man or a woman rests, in the last instance, on a single first-person report: I know what I am. That report is to be accepted without question and without corroboration, on pain of social sanction for doubting it. It is a curious epistemology that treats one person's account of an inner sense of gender as unimpeachable, and the shared, checkable bodily experience of half the species as mere anecdote.

Objection four: the hard cases of sex development.

Finally, the cases biology itself makes difficult. Consider complete androgen insensitivity. The person is chromosomally XY and has testes, but the body's tissues do not respond to androgens. The body therefore develops along female lines; the person is raised and lives as a woman from birth, and has never produced the response described in section 3. Does such a case not show that the male body is a less tidy affair than this essay supposes?

It shows the opposite. That body never developed the male response, and the reason is not a declaration but a receptor. The case demonstrates precisely what this essay asserts: that the lived sexed body is settled by the body's development, not by the self's narrative. The hard cases in this field are variations in what the body does. Not one of them is a case of the body doing as it was told.

None of these objections, then, touches the thesis. The first changes the subject. The second mistakes the witness for the defendant. The third holds the essay to a standard its opponents would never dream of applying to themselves. And the fourth, on closer inspection, turns out to be testifying for the prosecution. One objection, however, is of another calibre.

The Serious Objection: Man as a Social Position

The objections so far could be seen off over a cup of tea. This one can't. It comes not from the placard but from the seminar room, and it owes nothing to self-identification. It deserves to be met on its own terms.

Its best-known statement is Sally Haslanger's 2000 paper, "Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?"[10], which has since become something of a founding text in the philosophy of gender. Haslanger's question is not what we mean by "man" and "woman" but what we ought to mean, if our concepts are to help us understand inequality and do something about it. Her analysis is what she calls ameliorative. Put simply: to be a man is to be systematically privileged in some area of social life (economic, political, legal) and to be singled out for that privilege by bodily features, real or imagined, taken as signs of a male reproductive role. To be a woman is the same, with subordination in place of privilege. And the hope, quite openly stated, is that once the hierarchy has gone, there will be no men or women in this sense left.

To her credit, this is no circle. A man here is not whoever says he is one; he is whoever ends up in a certain position for certain reasons, and that is something one can go and look at. It also gets hold of something real. It explains, for one thing, why the boy in section 1 had such a rough time of it: the playground was handing out places, and he would not take the one he had been given. This is a serious account of a real phenomenon. What remains to be seen is whether that phenomenon is what "man" actually names, and whether it can push aside the one this essay has been describing.

The first difficulty is that the account leans on sex at every turn. To pick out the men, it has to appeal to bodily features read as evidence of a male reproductive role. Even when people get it wrong, what they get wrong is sex: what they think they are seeing is a male body. The social category, in other words, cannot be stated without the sexual one. It is an account of what society does with sexed bodies, not a substitute for them. Haslanger, to be fair, never pretends otherwise. She keeps sex and gender apart and nowhere suggests that a social position could rewrite the body.

So the quarrel between her and this essay is narrower than it looks. She is studying a position; I have been describing a lived body. The only real question is which of the two gets the word. And here her own terminology rather gives the game away. An ameliorative analysis is a proposal about what we should mean, not an account of what we do mean. As politics, it may be a perfectly good proposal. As a refutation of a description of what is, it is no use at all.

The second difficulty is that the account turns passing, in the sense of section 5, into a definition. A man, for Haslanger, is someone taken for male and treated as such: being seen as, promoted to a criterion. She is admirably willing to follow this wherever it leads. A trans man who passes counts as a man; one who doesn't, doesn't. A man who, in some setting, enjoyed no privilege of any kind would, in that setting, stop being one. These are her conclusions, not my caricature of them, and they make plain that her concept and mine are not about the same thing.

The clearest proof, though, is her utopia. Imagine the programme succeeds in full. The hierarchy collapses; no one is privileged or held down because of their sexual features; and so, on her definition, there are no more men. In this perfectly fair society, a thirteen-year-old boy is sitting in a lesson. Without consulting him, his body produces an erection. The bell goes, and he stays put, an exercise book across his lap. Nothing described in sections 3 and 4 has altered in the slightest. Whatever the abolition of gender did away with, it was not the thing this essay has been talking about. The lived male body comes through the disappearance of Haslanger's men without a scratch, which is as good a sign as any that they were never the same thing.

The third difficulty is about where one looks. The next section will argue that the culture of man up and the doctrine of self-identification make the same mistake: both treat being a man as something you do, whether by feats or by words. Haslanger avoids that mistake, but only by making a closely related one. On her view, being a man is something done to you, a place others put you in.

I don't mean this as a moral charge. Haslanger wants to tear down exactly what the playground wanted to keep standing. The point is about where they look. The playground decided who was a man by how he was treated; Haslanger defines a man by how he is treated. One wants the hierarchy enforced and the other wants it dismantled, but both have their eyes on the same thing: social treatment. This essay has been arguing that the answer was somewhere else all along, under the desk, in a body that answered regardless of how anyone treated it.

The debate didn't stop with Haslanger, and there is one more turn worth following. Her account came at an obvious price: trans women who don't pass are not treated as women, so they fall outside it. In 2016 Katharine Jenkins offered a way round this ("Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman")[11] that would let them in without falling back on circular self-declaration. Alongside Haslanger's social class, Jenkins adds a gender identity: having an internal "map" formed to guide a member of that class through the social and material realities typical of it. The circle is avoided, because "woman" here refers to the social class rather than to a word one says about oneself.

But the refinement only moves the problem; it doesn't solve it. For one thing, the class the map is meant to steer you through is still defined by perceived sexual features, so the map inherits Haslanger's dependence on sex. For another, and more importantly, a map is a disposition of the self: a way of finding one's bearings, of anticipating, of moving through the social world. That is exactly the sort of thing the two dissociations were about. Having a woman's internal map doesn't give you a body that responds like a woman's, and it doesn't quieten one that responds like a man's. The trans woman of section 6 may have the most detailed map imaginable; her body, in the classroom or in bed, will carry on answering in its own language. Jenkins has given the self a more sophisticated atlas. The territory hasn't moved.

None of this means denying what Haslanger and Jenkins are studying. Social positions are real. They hand out privilege and suffering, and they deserve to be analysed and, where necessary, taken apart. Inner orientations are real too. What this essay denies is that either of them is what "man" names in the first place, or that either could stand in for what both of them depend on. There is what society does with bodies, and there is what the self makes of its body. Before either, there is what the body does.

Which leaves us where we began: with a boy in a classroom.

Coda: The Body Does Not Ask

Let us return to the boy we began with. He is grown now. Perhaps he never did learn to kick a ball; perhaps he still weeps at the cinema; perhaps he desires men, perhaps not. He spent a good part of his life being told to man up, being told he was not quite there yet, that he lacked something the others had. What none of those shouting at him knew was that the question had been settled years before. It was not settled on the playground or the football pitch, where they were looking for it, but under the desk, in silence, behind an exercise book. One ordinary morning his body answered without asking him anything, and he stayed in his seat waiting for the bell. That morning he did nothing whatsoever to be a man. His body did it for him.

This essay has had two principal adversaries, and it is worth saying at the end what they have in common. The first is the old culture of man up, which requires men to prove their condition through strength, courage, conquest and silence in the face of pain. The second is the contemporary theory of self-identification, which holds that one is a man by declaring oneself one. They look like irreconcilable enemies, and in many respects they are. One is the father shouting at his delicate son; the other is the faculty scandalised by that father. Yet they share an underlying error, and it is the same error: both believe that being a man is something one does. For the first, it is a feat to be accomplished; for the second, a word to be pronounced. In both cases the protagonist is the self, either acting or declaring. The academic version discussed in the previous section, for all its seriousness, merely recast the protagonist: in place of the self, it put other people, who treat and classify.

What this essay has tried to show is that, at the level of the lived body, being a man is not something one does, nor something one declares, nor something others do to one. It is something that happens to one. It is neither won nor declared. It is received. It arrives before the self, without asking leave, and the self finds out afterwards. That is why the man who fails at the feat does not cease to be a man, and why the one who pronounces the word does not become one. The masculinity the father demanded and the identity the theory proclaims are, each in its own way, attempts by the self to lay claim to something that is not its own.

This does not condemn the self to passivity. It can do a great deal with its body. It can interpret it, accept it, enjoy it, reject it, hide it, silence it, and mourn what the body no longer gives. It can even mutilate it. The one thing it cannot do is author it. The self always arrives late to a conversation the body began without it.

There is something humbling in this, and it would be dishonest to disguise it. Our age has made self-determination its most cherished dogma, and it finds it hard to accept that there is something in us we did not choose, cannot redesign, and which has, on top of everything, the discourtesy to show itself in public. But there may also be a certain relief in it. The delicate boy never had to earn what he was. No one could shout it out of him, and no one could ever confer it on him by decree. It was given to him, as breathing and the heartbeat are given to us, without anyone consulting us.

Nobody asked that boy whether he identified as a man. The body does not ask. It answers.

References

[1] Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations, Fifth Meditation. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. Original 1931. ↩ Go back

[2] Young, Iris Marion. "Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility and Spatiality." Human Studies 3, no. 2 (1980): 137–156. ↩ Go back

[3] Husserl, Edmund. Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic. Ed. Ludwig Landgrebe. Trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. Original 1939. ↩ Go back

[4] Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception, Part One, ch. V, "The Body in Its Sexual Being." Trans. Donald A. Landes. London: Routledge, 2012. Original 1945. ↩ Go back

[5] Augustine of Hippo. The City of God against the Pagans, Book XIV, chs. 15–24. Trans. R. W. Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Original c. 413–426. ↩ Go back

[6] Chivers, Meredith L., Michael C. Seto, Martin L. Lalumière, Ellen Laan and Teresa Grimbos. "Agreement of Self-Reported and Genital Measures of Sexual Arousal in Men and Women: A Meta-Analysis." Archives of Sexual Behavior 39, no. 1 (2010): 5–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-009-9556-9 ↩ Go back

[7] Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, §16. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell, 1962. Original 1927. ↩ Go back

[8] Aristotle. Categories, ch. 10, and Metaphysics, Book V (Δ), ch. 22. In The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. ↩ Go back

[9] Carroll, Lewis. Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There. London: Macmillan, 1871. ↩ Go back

[10] Haslanger, Sally. "Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?" Noûs 34, no. 1 (2000): 31–55. ↩ Go back

[11] Jenkins, Katharine. "Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman." Ethics 126, no. 2 (2016): 394–421. ↩ Go back