I recently published a manifesto announcing my retirement from homosexuality and my admission to Uranism. It was satire, and like any satire worth the name it was born of frustration: the discovery that the word by which I had called myself throughout my adult life no longer said what I needed it to say. Humour was the way out. In writing it, however, I found that beneath the joke lay a serious problem the joke could not quite articulate, and that my change of word, presented there as identitarian caprice, rests on a justification that can be set out without a trace of irony. This essay sets it out.

The question awaiting me is predictable enough. If I am a man who desires other men, why do I not simply go on calling myself gay? The short answer is to send whoever asks to look up the definition. The one any search returns, beginning with Wikipedia’s entry, defines homosexuality as romantic attraction, sexual attraction or sexual behaviour between people of the same sex or gender. My questioner reads this and considers the matter closed, since I desire people of my own sex and the definition plainly includes me. He is right that it includes me. What he fails to see is that the same sentence also includes others by a criterion that is not mine, and that this double entry, invisible so long as each of us speaks only of himself, becomes decisive the moment two people use the word to find each other.

A sexual orientation does not end with the person who declares it. It has a direction: there is someone who desires, and there is a set, open and imprecise but real, towards which that desire points. To say «I am gay» tells you something about me and, in the same breath, something about who may appear to me as an object of desire; and when another man tells me he is gay too, the word lets me anticipate something of the relation that might obtain between us. It never promised we would fancy each other. He may have an insufferable voice or a habit of quoting Deleuze while unbuttoning his shirt, and the category never undertook to spare me either. What it offered was more modest and rather more useful: it marked out the field within which liking or disliking could occur. That function is the one that concerns me, and it is the one the disjunctive definition compromises.

I have no wish to decide who is entitled to call himself gay, nor to post customs officers at the border of the word. I still hold that homosexual means same sex, with undiminished conviction, but being right about what a word means is not the same as owning it. The meaning of a category whose job is to coordinate encounters is fixed by collective use, and it takes only a portion of speakers using it by another criterion for it to stop working as a shared signal, however correct my definition. I therefore concede the battle for the word homosexual. We have lost it, and we shall not get it back.

I distrust colonialism as the skeleton key that now opens every door in the humanities, but here it describes a mechanism with some precision, and I use it in that operative sense, with no historiographical pretensions. Colonising a territory does not require expelling its inhabitants; it is enough to install the newcomer’s categories and make them binding on everyone, so that the native must describe himself in a language no longer his own. That is what happened to the word homosexual. Queer activism, and the theory that licenses it, occupied its definition, added a criterion it never had, and now administers from that position who belongs and on what terms. And what has been colonised is never wholly recovered. The former colonies of the Americas have been independent for two centuries and still speak the coloniser’s language and legislate in his juridical categories; independence restored their sovereignty, and not one of them got back the language that came before. So it is with homosexual. No culture war, no semantic, linguistic or philosophical campaign will return it to its meaning, because every future use will bear the mark of the occupation. On the evidence, we have lost to queer activism the war over what the word homosexual means.

The casting deserves a note, since those most fluent in the vocabulary of colonialism tend to assign the roles the other way round. In this story the colonised are the homosexuals who kept the definition, and the colonisers are the queer activists and theorists who occupied it. If anyone owes an act of contrition, it is they. And, as colonisers do, they call the native’s resistance backwardness: the homosexual who insists that his desire is oriented by sex is diagnosed with internalised transphobia, much as the native who kept his gods was declared an idolater. What I describe is the view from the colonised, and anyone who speaks of colonialism seriously knows it is the first view to be heard. If they mean to be consistent in their use of the term, they will have to respect it.

So I do not ask for the word back. The only decolonisation left to me is exodus: leaving the occupied territory and founding another. The word with which I found it is Uranian, an old word, older than our semantic wars and abandoned so long ago that nobody guards it, to which I assign a single criterion. A Uranian is a man who desires men qua men, male bodies included. To explain why that definition does what the other no longer does, I must first show precisely where the other breaks.

1. A Definition with Two Doors

Take the definition as it circulates. «Attraction to people of the same sex or gender» looks generous, since the disjunction accommodates different ways of understanding orientation without obliging anyone to settle beforehand what sex and gender are. But a disjunction between two terms is harmless only if the terms are interchangeable, and these are not. Were sex and gender names for the same thing, the «or» would be redundant and the definition could dispense with one of them. That it keeps both is an admission that they designate different things, and two different criteria can carve out different sets of people. Through that conjunction the occupation came in, and it had no need to expel anyone from the word; it was enough to open a second door.

Wikipedia’s own entry shows as much without meaning to. It opens with the disjunctive formula, and further down it quotes the amicus brief the American Psychological Association filed, with other professional bodies, before the Supreme Court of California in In re Marriage Cases, according to which sexual acts and romantic attractions are classified as homosexual or heterosexual by the biological sex of the people involved, relative to one another. The same brief holds that sexual orientation is always defined in relational terms and marks out the universe of persons with whom one is likely to find satisfying relationships. The APA’s own Dictionary of Psychology, in an entry last updated in 2023, defines homosexuality as attraction or activity between members of the same sex, with no mention of gender. On the very page anyone consults to learn what the word means, then, a definition with two criteria sits alongside a professional authority that uses only one whenever it defines, and that understands orientation exactly as I do: by its relation to others.

Now suppose two men who call themselves gay. A is male and desires males; he reads the definition by its first half and recognises himself in it, since he desires people of his own sex. B is a trans man who desires men; he reads it by its second half and recognises himself too, since he desires people of his own gender. Neither strains the text or misrepresents himself. Each came in through one of the two doors the definition left open, and each can cite it in support of his self-description. Nor need we establish which reading came first historically or which is politically preferable; the definition licenses both.

So long as each speaks of himself, nothing is amiss. A says «I am gay» and tells the truth by the rule he was given; so does B. But the word they both utter does not carry with it the door by which each entered. Whoever reads «gay» on another man’s profile receives the label and nothing of the criterion, and since the label is the same, it is only natural to assume the criterion is too, that the other came in by one’s own door. That assumption was sound while the word had a single entrance. With two it ceases to be, and nothing in the word announces the change.

What has been lost admits of precise statement. A category has an intension, the criterion one must meet to belong to it, and an extension, the set of those who meet it. «Gay» retains an intension broad enough for both A and B to recognise themselves in it, but that intension is disjunctive, and a disjunctive intension yields as its extension the union of two sets. To each member of the union the word confirms that he belongs; it does not tell him to which of the two sets the man beside him belongs. The category has gained in extension and lost in inferential power: it answers as well as ever the question of how someone identifies, and rather worse the question of what I can know about him from that identification.

For most words such a loss would be a lexicographer’s curiosity. If two people introduce themselves as opera lovers and one has Verdi in mind while the other means Andrew Lloyd Webber, the misunderstanding is cleared up over the first drink and costs, at worst, an evening. Words of sexual orientation have another destiny: they are used to decide whom to approach and with whom to go home, and their reason for being is to anticipate, however roughly, the relation that might obtain between speaker and listener. Such a word can remain in perfect order as a description of whoever utters it and fail at precisely the task for which it exists. What happens when A and B stop talking about themselves and meet is the business of the next section.

2. The Encounter

A dating app strips the question of all philosophical ornament, since nobody goes there to find himself: one goes to find others, and the label on each profile serves to decide which way to swipe. A and B sign up, tick «gay», and are placed in the same population. Administratively the operation is flawless, since two users declared the same orientation and the system grouped them together. From the standpoint of those about to meet, it has just manufactured a misunderstanding that neither of them committed.

B looks at A’s profile and sees precisely what he is after, a man, within the field towards which his desire is oriented; the shared label adds the expectation that the field is reciprocal and that he himself lies within A’s. A looks at B’s profile and draws, at first, the same inference: he sees «man», he sees «gay», and the combination tells him what it has always told him. But if A’s criterion is sex, the inference is false, and false without anyone having lied. B misrepresented nothing and A read in good faith. The error was produced by the word, which let two people in through different doors and seated them at the same table as though they had come in by the same one.

This misunderstanding is not to be confused with others that resemble it. Had B claimed to be six foot three and turned out to be five foot three, there would be a descriptive falsehood, and the fault would have an owner. Had A declared an interest in anyone who identifies as a man and then rejected B, he could be charged with inconsistency between word and deed. Neither is the case here. A never used «man» in the operative sense in which B uses it; both shared the term, and in each of them the term was wired to a different criterion. To say that both of them like men conceals the divergence rather than explaining it, because the word man is doing two jobs in a single sentence.

The decisive distinction separates two ways of not desiring someone. A gay man goes through life without desiring the overwhelming majority of gay men, and the category is none the worse for it: the indifference occurs within a field both recognise, and the man who goes undesired knows, at least, that he was eligible. That exclusion is individual. What happens between A and B is of another kind. A does not exclude B on account of something B has within a shared field; by the criterion through which A understands his orientation, B lay outside the field from the start, whereas by B’s criterion A lay within it. The non-reciprocity ceases to be personal and becomes categorial, and a category that produces categorial non-reciprocity among its own members fails at precisely what it exists to do.

Both positions can be stated in complete sincerity. B can say that he correctly recognised in A someone towards whom his orientation could be directed; A can reply that he cannot say the same of B by the criterion through which he understands his own. The asymmetry, moreover, runs in both directions of knowledge. From the label, A cannot tell whether B belongs to his field, and B cannot tell whether he belongs to A’s. Each knows who he is and what he seeks; what the word no longer tells him is who he is for the other. A sexual orientation describes its subject by way of a possible relation, and that relation has two ends. The word that names it must let me say who I am and, with equal precision, let the other understand who I might be for him. A sexual identity that obliges one to ask again what it has just conveyed has ceased to convey it.

The practical remedy confirms the diagnosis. Apps let users state in a separate field whether they are trans, and anyone wishing to object to this essay will say the problem is solved by a filter. But a filter that has to be invented to recover what the word once said unaided is a confession that the word has stopped saying it. Nobody ever needed a filter to tell gay men from straight women, because the word saw to it. When that information has to travel through a separate field, the label still names a community and no longer works as a signal for the encounter. The colonised know the scene well: every time the native must translate himself to be understood on his own land, the occupier’s language has taken another position.

It remains to be seen whether anyone gains from this enlargement, and in particular whether B, for whom the word opened the door, finds on the other side what the door promised him.

3. What the Door Promises

The redefinition presents itself as a gain for B, and in one sense it is: the word names him and admits him to a community that once left him outside. But B did not need the word gay as a certificate of membership; he needed it for what A needed it for, to find others. And there the gain changes its nature. The definition can include B in the category of those who desire men, but it cannot include him in the desire of those already in the category by the other criterion. Semantic membership is granted by definition; erotic reciprocity is granted by nothing, because desire does not accept updates by decree.

The word, then, promises B a field it cannot deliver. It sends him into a population in which a portion of the members, those who read the word by sex, do not include him in their horizon, and it sends him there expecting the opposite, since the shared label assures him that everyone stands in the same field. Each time that portion turns him down, B receives the rejection as a personal slight, because the definition told him the criterion was the same. What he actually met was a different criterion, one the word had taken care to hide from him.

Nor does A come away unscathed. He has lost the signal by which he found his bearings, and in every encounter of this kind he is handed a role he did not choose. If the word asserts that A and B share the field, then within that word A’s failure to reciprocate admits of only one explanation: prejudice. The redefinition produces the misunderstanding and produces its moral reading as well, for what the structure manufactured the definition ascribes to A’s character. «Internalised transphobia» is the name a defective definition gives to its own failure. And B, who received the promise, is cast as the accuser, because the only account of events the word offers him is that he was discriminated against.

I know this from experience. It was a dinner with a great deal of chemistry and kisses that promised rather a lot. When my hand went looking for what the word had announced, it found nothing, and on the third attempt he explained that I would not find it because he was trans, and that there were plenty of fun things we could do without penetration. My desire did not wait to be consulted: it beat a retreat no sonographer could have tracked. I told him the truth, that nothing like this had ever happened to me and that it had thrown me, and the evening carried on pleasantly for as long as it was conversation, since outside the sexual we got on famously. When he tried to kiss me again, I told him I was not comfortable and would rather leave it there.

His answer was the one the definition had prepared for him. He said it always happened to him and reproached me for what «you gays» always do, a phrase that makes sense only if the word gay had assured him I belonged to his field. When I pointed out that we could have spared ourselves the awkward moment had he told me beforehand, he replied that the awkwardness came from my cisheteropatriarchal expectations, a term I reject and quote only because it was his. By his criterion there was nothing to disclose, since the word told him we shared the field, and those who share the field owe no one an explanation. By mine, the omission settled everything. Neither of us had misused the word; the word had handed each of us a different map of the same territory.

The most revealing part came afterwards, over the two blocks I walked home. I left feeling like the foulest thing afloat in the Thames, asking myself whether I was transphobic, because the definition had handed me its moral reading of events as well, and I had adopted it without noticing. It took me two blocks to realise that I owed no one a justification for not desiring what I do not desire, and that my desire owes obedience to no philosophy and no politics. That is the power of the word: to the one who came in through the new door it hands a culprit, and to the one who still believed in the old door it hands, on top of that, the guilt.

Who gains, then? The category gains, growing in number, and so do those who administer it, who can now display a more inclusive definition and a larger community. The cost is paid, encounter by encounter, by A and B, who are precisely the people using the word for what a word of orientation exists to do. It is the bookkeeping of every colony: the metropolis enters the profit in its ledgers and the colony pays on the ground. The enlargement carried out in B’s name gave him a name and took away what the name was for.

4. The Moral Objection

The predictable reply to all of the above does not dispute the semantics; it skips them. It holds that the trouble lies with A and not with the word, that his discomfort is transphobia, that his orientation towards sex is a «genital preference», and that a person free of prejudice would revisit it. It deserves to be taken seriously, since it will be the first to arrive, and since on examination it falls on two counts.

Let us grant for a moment the hardest premise, that A’s desire merits moral reproach. The reproach mends nothing this essay describes. Were A the worst of men, the word would still have two doors, B would still be entering a field unable to deliver what it promises, and the next time two people met under the same label they would once again discover, too late, that they had been reading different criteria. Moral judgement falls on persons, and the failure falls on the word. Moralising A’s desire does not restore to the category the function it has lost.

Nor does the premise hold. No homosexual man chose to desire men, and that absence of choice was the central argument of gay liberation: orientation is not a preference to be corrected by willpower, therapy or good conscience. The movement fought for decades to retire the phrase «sexual preference», precisely because it implied that desire is chosen and may therefore be re-educated. To call orientation towards sex a «genital preference» revives that vocabulary against the very homosexuals who defeated it. If my desire for male bodies is a revisable preference, so is homosexuality as a whole, and the invitation to deconstruct it repeats, in its structure, the one conversion therapists used to extend, with a different tone and different allies. The new coloniser asks of the native what the old one did: that his body conform to the map.

There is, finally, an ethic the activism itself invokes in every other context, that of consent. Nobody is owed anyone’s desire, and a person’s no stands without theoretical justification. When I said no, I exercised the right granted to anyone in the face of anyone. To demand that the no be explained, or to treat it as a symptom awaiting a cure, turns refusal into debt. What does admit moral judgement is conduct: if A humiliates B, mocks him or exposes him, he deserves every reproach one cares to make. Conduct is judged; desire is not.

The moral objection, then, does not touch the problem and rests on a premise the history of homosexuality has already refuted. It remains to show what a word needs in order to resume the function this one has lost, and why Uranian does.

5. A Word with a Single Door

A Uranian is a man who desires men qua men, male bodies included. The definition has a single door because its two terms do not compete: it does not say «sex or gender»; it says the man and his body at once, so that nobody can enter by one half and leave the other outside. And that conjunction holds in both directions. If every Uranian desires male bodies, and the word exists to assure each of them that he lies within the other’s field, then the Uranian must be what he desires. No one need add this as a condition of admission, for it follows from the word’s function: a category of orientation coordinates encounters only if each member belongs to the field of all the others, and the only way to guarantee that is for the criterion of belonging and the criterion of being desired to be one and the same.

It is worth being precise about what the word promises, since it is less than a hasty reader would credit it with. It does not promise that every Uranian desires every other; that promise would be absurd, and no word has ever kept it. Uranians will go on failing to fancy one another for the usual reasons, the voice, the smell, the conversation, or a weakness for quoting Deleuze at the least opportune moment. What the word promises is that when two Uranians do not desire each other, it will not be because they were reading different criteria. It removes a single kind of uncertainty, the categorial, and leaves the individual intact, which belongs to the encounter and is what makes it interesting. It restores to the label precisely what the redefinition took from gay: the possibility of knowing, before the trousers come down, whether one stands within the other’s field.

Nor does the word take anything from anyone. Quite the reverse: I make B a present of gay, tied with an enormous gold bow and wrapped in rainbow paper. Let him define it by gender and stretch it upwards, downwards and sideways with all the elasticity of a latex ceiling; it is his. He keeps the word and the community it sustains, by every right. He also keeps what the word produces, since it comes in the same parcel. Outside Uranism there remain others who still call themselves gay and understand the word as I once did, and B’s next date may be with C, who reads the criterion as A does, so that the scene plays out again under other names. B inherits this as a consequence, with neither guilt nor punishment: whoever adopts a word with an «or» between two criteria inherits what that «or» does. I hope he comes to see it, but I oblige him to nothing and expel him from nowhere.

Nor shall I fight to be the true homosexual. That quarrel, in its most popular version, sets two straw men against each other, and straw men have a well-known defect: when one catches fire the whole stack goes up, and anyone passing with a match can burn them both. If B wishes to be the true homosexual, the position is vacant, since I no longer consider myself one. I accept his definition without dispute, as the age demands that every definition anyone gives of himself be accepted.

With Uranian, by contrast, the scene cannot recur in good faith. The definition is written down from the outset; it did not settle out of usage, nor does it rest on a tacit understanding someone might read otherwise, and the bodies it names are sexed bodies, which admit no alternative reading. Whoever lacks such a body knows, before calling himself Uranian, that he is not one. With gay, B came in in good faith through a door the definition held open for him; with Uranian, to come in without meeting the criterion would be to lie, and a lie, unlike a misunderstanding, does have an owner. That a trans man is not Uranian says no more than that a woman is not, or that I am not a lesbian: the word names a determinate field, and a determinate field leaves things outside by definition, with no judgement passed on whoever finds himself there.

The obvious objection remains: what happened to gay could happen to Uranian. Nothing prevents someone, tomorrow, from opening a second door. But the word has a defence gay lacked, which is that its sole reason for existing is the single door. Gay was born to name a community, and a community can grow without ceasing to be one; Uranian is born to name a criterion, and a criterion doubled is no longer a criterion. Whoever wants a word with two doors already has one, and a far larger one. The coloniser has no incentive to invade a plot whose only wealth is the precision he would destroy by occupying it.

There is, moreover, an irony I have no wish to hide. I arrived at Uranian by the very road I criticise: I self-identified into a word and assigned it a meaning of my own, without asking its history’s leave. The difference lies in what the self-definition does. The one that occupied gay opened a door in a word that worked and left it without a function; mine closes the only door of an abandoned word and gives it one. Self-identification can build something too, provided what it builds is more precise than what stood before, and not less.

So I raise the white flag. You are right, B: you are gay. I defend your right to be so, and should anyone come after you for it, they will have me to deal with, in person if need be. But I am not gay, and this time I am telling you before dinner: I am Uranian. You are gay by the new definition, I am Uranian by mine, and neither of us need persuade the other of anything. I know of no more peaceable way of saying what I am saying, nor of one more awkward for those who needed us to go on fighting over the same word.

Conclusion: The Farewell

What this essay says fits into two videos the queens of my generation used to watch on late-night television. On the left, Dido sings that she will not raise the white flag; on the right, Björk is shut in a padded room in a psychiatric hospital, with a happiness too large for the walls. The one on the left is me: I raised the white flag over the word, and over affection I shall not raise it, for I leave without ceasing to love those who stay. The room on the right is the one the word builds for B so long as I remain inside. The inclusive definition is the padding, built so that nobody gets hurt, and B is left there with the happiness of being named, a real happiness that crashes into the walls every time someone like me, under the same label, tells him no. That is why I withdraw. Every A who leaves for a word of his own is one wall fewer for B, and I have no wish to go on being one of those walls.

I was asked why I am Uranian and not gay, and the answer lies in what an orientation is. A sexual orientation does not end in a definition of oneself: it is also a direction towards others, and a word that no longer lets one recognise that towards whom has stopped doing half its job. I do not abandon gay because it has ceased to describe others, nor merely because it has ceased to describe me. I abandon it because it has ceased to tell me, with the precision required and no less, who those others are to me and who I am to them.

The mechanism I have described is not peculiar to this word. It is at work wherever a category that served to coordinate bodies, in sport or in single-sex spaces, has been handed a second criterion that says nothing of bodies. That argument deserves an essay of its own, and it shall have one.

It remains for me to take leave of the word. Gay and homosexual named me throughout my adult life, and through them I learnt that what I desired was neither a sickness nor a sin. I leave them with the gratitude of one who leaves a house where he was happy and which is no longer his, bearing no grudge against those who live there now. For that farewell I have chosen a song almost nobody knows, «Long Time Traveller», an old American hymn sung in three-part harmony by The Wailin’ Jennys, about a traveller long on the road through a world that is not his own and who knows where he is going. I too travelled a long time under a word that ended up belonging to others. Now I am going home, and home is called Uranian.

Sources

Wikipedia, «Homosexuality» (accessed 6 November 2026). American Psychological Association et al., amicus curiae brief in In re Marriage Cases, Supreme Court of California, S147999, 26 September 2007, p. 7. APA Dictionary of Psychology, «homosexuality» (updated 15 November 2023).